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1 INTRODUCTION 
This research focuses on the development of an 
Initial Bayesian Network (BN) model for modelling 
system and component failures on a large offshore 
installation. The intention of the presented research is 
to model a sequence of events following a specific 
component failure, under certain conditions and 
assumptions. This sequence of events is then applied 
to a BN model using a proposed methodology. This 
should provide a base with which to expand the BN 
model to facilitate the requirement of having a 
dynamic risk assessment model within an NUI 
(Normally Unattended Installation) - Integrity Case.  
An Asset Integrity Case will enable the user to 
determine the impact of deficiencies in asset integrity 
on the potential loss of life and demonstrate that 
integrity is being managed to ensure safe operations. 
The Integrity Case is an extended Safety Case. Where 
safety cases demonstrate that safety procedures are in 
place, the Integrity Case shall ensure that the safety 
procedures are properly implemented. The Integrity 
Case can be applicable to operations for any large 
scale asset, and in the case of this research the large 
asset for which the Integrity Case shall be developed 
is an offshore installation (RMRI Plc., 2011). By 
expanding on this Integrity Case proposal, it is 
intended that an Integrity Case be developed for a 
Normally Unattended Installation (NUI) in 
conjunction with a dynamic risk assessment model to 
maintain a live representation of an offshore 
installations integrity. Furthermore, it is proposed that 
the NUI-Integrity Case be initially developed 
utilising a manned installation, but modelling failure 
and risks without human presence on board. This is 
due to a much larger range of failure data being 
available regarding manned installations as opposed 
to unmanned installations. Similarly, should a risk 
assessment model be feasible for various hazardous 
zones of an installation, and the dynamic model 
proves to be effective in the detection of failures and 
mapping of consequences, it may be possible to 
reduce the number of personnel on board manned 
offshore installations, to reduce the risk of injury and 
fatality.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents a brief background into the origins of the 
research. A proposed  methodology of constructing a 
BN model is shown in section 3. Section 4 outlines 
and analyses a case study to demonstrate the proposed 
methodology. Section 5 summarizes the work. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1  Offshore Safety Assessment  
Following the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha 
disaster, the responsibilities for offshore safety 
regulations were transferred from the Department of 
Energy to the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) 
through the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as the 
singular regulatory body for safety in the offshore 
industry (Wang, 2002) (Department of Energy, 
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1990). In response to this the HSE launched a review 
of all safety legislation and subsequently 
implemented changes. The propositions sought to 
replace the legislations that were seen as prescriptive 
to a more “goal setting” approach. Several regulations 
were produced, with the mainstay being the Health 
and Safety at Work Act (HSE, Health and Safety 
Executive, 1992). Under this a draft of the offshore 
installations safety case regulations was produced. 
The regulations required operational safety cases to 
be prepared for all offshore installations, both fixed 
and mobile. Within this all new fixed installations 
require a design safety case and for mobile 
installations, the duty holder is the owner (Wang, 
2002). 
After many years of employing the safety case 
approach in the UK offshore industry, the regulations 
were expanded in 1996 to include verification of 
Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). Also the offshore 
installations and wells regulations were introduced to 
deal with various stages of the life cycle of the 
installation. SCEs are parts of an installation and its 
plant, including computer programs or any part 
whose failure could cause or contribute substantially 
to or whose purpose of which is to prevent or limit the 
effect of a major accident (Wang, 2002) (HSE, Health 
and Safety Executive, 1996). 
Recently, however, it is felt that an expansion on 
Safety Cases is necessary, especially in the offshore 
and marine industry, as they are static documents that 
are produced at the inception of offshore installations 
and contains a structured argument demonstrating 
that the evidence contained therein is sufficient to 
show that the system is safe (Auld, 2013). However, 
this is the full extent of the Safety Case, it involves 
very little updating unless an operational or facility 
change is made. It can be difficult to navigate through 
a safety case; they can be difficult for project teams 
and regulators to understand, as well as often being 
monolithic (Risktec, 2013). This is where the e-Safety 
Case comes into play. e-Safety Cases are html web-
based electronic Safety Cases. They are much easier 
to navigate and have clear concise information about 
the safety of the facility they are provided for. 
However, the QRA data (Quantified Risk 
Assessment) is only updated with the release of 
updated regulations (Cockram & Lockwood, 2003). 
Over the past 10 years it has been stated that a 
dynamic risk assessment model is required within the 
offshore and process industries. Khakzad, et al., 
(2013) proposed to apply BN to Bow-Tie (BT) 
analysis. They postulated that the addition of BN to 
BT would help to overcome the static limitations of 
BT and show that the combination could be a 
substantial dynamic risk assessment tool. Similarly, 
in the oil, gas & process industry Yang & Mannan, 
(2010) proposed a methodology of Dynamic 
operational Risk Assessment (DORA). This starts 
from a conceptual framework design to mathematical 
modelling and to decision making based on cost-
benefit analysis. Furthermore, Eleye-Datubo, et al. 
(2006) proposed an offshore decision-support 
solution, through BN techniques, to demonstrate that 
it is necessary to model the assessment domain such 
that the probabilistic measure of each event becomes 
more reliable in light of new evidence being received. 
This method is prefered, as opposed to obtaining data 
incrementally, causing uncertainty from imperfect 
understanding and incomplete knowledge of the 
domain being analysed. Finally, RMRI Plc. (2011) 
proposed the idea of a dynamic decision making tool 
in an Asset Integrity Case. 
The Integrity Case, an idea proposed by RMRI Plc. 
(Risk Management Research Institute), can be said to 
be dynamic as it shall be continually updated with the 
QRA data for an installation as the QRA data is 
recorded. This allows for the integrity of the various 
systems and components of a large asset, such as an 
offshore installation, to be continually monitored. 
This continual updating of the assets QRA data 
allows for the users to have a clearer understanding of 
the current status of an asset. It also allows the user to 
identify the impact of any deviation from specified 
performance standards, as well as facilitate more 
efficient identification of appropriate risk reduction 
measures, identify key trends within assets (i.e.: 
failures, failure modes). Reporting to regulators 
would improve greatly and it would provide a 
historical audit trail for the asset. Furthermore, the 
integrity of an asset is maintained so that potential 
loss of life is kept ALARP. This means that an asset 
may continue safe operations under circumstances 
that may have instigated precautionary shutdown, 
resulting in considerable cost savings for the owner 
and operator (RMRI Plc., 2011). 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Modelling and Analysis Steps 
There are many step-by-step procedures in use that 
allow for construction of the various parts of the BN 
model. The procedures are useful as it allows for 
maintaining consistency throughout the process and 
offers an element of confidence to the model. The 
procedures have varying parts depending on the 
context of the model and how much information is 
already available (Neil, et al., 2000). However, there 
are key elements which all the procedures follow, 
these are: 
3.1.1 Establish the domain and project 
definition   
 
This involves putting boundaries in place for the 
model. In this analysis the domain is to be defined as 
a module on a large offshore installation. The model 
begins with an initial component failure and tracks 
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the cause and effect relationship of this failure on 
various other components and systems. The model 
ends with outlined consequences. The objective of the 
model involves stating what results are expected to be 
achieved from the model. For the model in this 
research the focus is on the interaction of the 
components and their probability of occurrence. 
3.1.2 Identify the set of variables relative to 
the problem 
 
This involves filtering possible parameters that are 
relevant to the description and objective. For the 
model the initial variables were devised utilising a 
sequence of events diagram. This sequence of events 
diagram represents the steps of various events with 
their order and causality. The events in the diagram 
are connected with arcs and arrows. This allows for a 
straightforward transition to a BN.  
3.1.3 Form Nodes and Arcs for the BN 
 
The events and consequences in the sequence of 
events are translated to corresponding parent and 
child nodes in the Bayesian Network. The sequence 
of events, however, is basic and the arcs do not 
directly translate to the BN and are determined in Step 
4. The nodes can be expressed as positive or negative. 
The causality between the events is translated to 
corresponding Conditional Probability Tables 
(CPTs). The CPTs are constructed in Step 5. Once the 
relevant nodes are identified, they are input into a BN 
software package, HuginResearcher7.7, and 
connected. This entails referring to the sequence of 
events from the initial failure to determine the most 
effective way of connecting the nodes together. The 
network is reviewed to ensure there are no missing 
factors. 
3.1.4 Data acquisition and analysis  
 
Primarily, data is sought from various sources 
including: industrial & academic publications, 
offshore risk assessment projects, as well as databases 
such as; the Offshore Reliability Database  
(OREDA), HSE & the International Association of 
Oil and Gas Producers database (OGP). However, 
should data not be widley available or the CPT for a 
node be much to large to constuct utilising data from 
the outlined sources, then expert judgement is to be 
utilised. The expert judgement is to be obtained using 
the Pairwise Comparision (PC) technique and 
analysed with the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP). The data from the AHP analysis is translated 
to the CPTs using a Symmetric Method. The data 
from relevent sources is then used to create the 
marginal or conditional probability tables. 
3.1.5  Analysis of BN model and Sensitivity 
Analysis  
 
This step concerns itself with the analysis of the 
BN model using Bayesian Inference. The probability 
of failure on demand of the operation is obtained by 
forward analysis. The posterior probabilities of the 
influencing factors can be calculated through 
backward analysis, given some evidence entered into 
the model. the propogation of the BN is conducted 
using Hugin Researcher 7.7. The results of the 
analysis provide useful information in handling the 
the effect of one failure on multiple components and 
systems. These results are demonstrated through a 
Sensitivity Analysis. The data for this analysis is 
again produced by the Hugin Researcher 7.7 
software. 
3.1.6 Validation of the BN Model  
 
Validation is a key aspect of the methodology as it 
provides a reasonable amount of confidence to the 
results of the model. In carrying out a full validation 
of the model, the parameters should be closely 
monitored for a given period of time. For modelling a 
specific failure within an electrical generator, this 
exercise is not practical. In current work and 
literature, there is a three axiom based validation 
procedure, which is used for partial validation of the 
proposed BN model. The three axioms to be satisfied 
are as follows (Jones, et al., 2010): 
 
Axiom i:  
A small increase or decrease in the prior subjective 
probabilities of each parent node should certainly 
result in the effect of a relative increase or decrease 
of the posterior probabilities of the child node. 
 
Axiom ii: 
Given the variation of subjective probability 
distributions of each parent node, its influence 
magnitude to the child node should be kept consistent. 
 
Axiom iii:  
The total influence magnitudes of the combination of 
the probability variations from “x” attributes 
(evidence) on the values should always be greater 
than that from the set of “x-y” (y ϵ x) attributes. 
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4 CASE STUDY 
4.1  Establish domain and model definition 
In order to demonstrate the proposed methodology 
a case study is used to evaluate of the effects a rotor 
retaining ring failure has on an offshore electrical 
generation unit. As well as other key systems, within 
and adjacent to a module of a large offsore 
installation. 
The electrical generation unit is considered to be 
of a generic layout for electrical generation on a large 
platform. The generator consists of a primary 
alternator, driven by a gas turbine. Located after the 
alternator is the exciter. The alternator rotor and shaft 
are forged in one piece with the exciter coupled on to 
one end. The opposite end of the shaft is coupled to 
the turbine drive shaft, which has an approximate 
operating speed of 3,600 rpm. The main shaft is 
supported by two main bearings, housed in pedastals, 
on stools on the baseplate. One bearing is situated 
between the turbine and the alternator and the other 
between the alternator and the exciter. A generic 
flowdiagram of an electrical generation unit is 
illustrated by Figure 1.  
4.2  Identifying  the set of variables relative to 
the problem 
The variables are identified based upon the failure 
of one specific component, in this case a Rotor 
Retaining Ring. Should one of the retaining rings fail, 
the main shaft would become unbalanced causing 
potential fragmentation of the rings inside the 
alternator. Given the extreme tolerances’ within the 
generator construction, the unbalanced shaft could 
also cause damage to other areas of the equipment, 
such as: the turbine blades and the exciter. Should the 
retaining ring fail within the alternator casing and 
fragment, debris would be created within the casing. 
Furthermore with the machine operating at 
approximately 3,600rpm, an out of balance shaft 
would cause substantial vibrations, which could cause 
the main bearings to fail. Should the bearings fail, 
causing the shaft to become misaligned, it would 
result in increased damage to the turbine, alternator 
and exciter (RMRI Plc., 2009).  
From this the most likely point of failure within the 
turbine is the turbine blades shearing. Multiple blade 
failure could lead to the turbine casing not fully 
containing the turbine blade debris. This would result 
in turbine blades being expelled through the turbine 
casing as high velocity projectiles. Continually, the 
violent shaft vibrations and misalignment could have 
a severe impact on the exciter and may result in the 
exciter, weighing approximately one tonne, 
becoming detached from the main shaft. Some 
catastrophic failures have resulted in the exciter 
breaking up and some have had the exciter remain 
mostly intact (RMRI Plc., 2009). Should the bearings 
not fail, the alternator stator coils & casing, can 
provide enough resistance and are substantial enough 
to prevent the debris from the retaining ring 
penetrating the alternator casing. However, it is 
possible for the fragments to be expelled axially 
towards either the turbine or the exciter or both.  (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
In the event of one or two rotor retaining ring 
failures, significant damage could occur within the 
alternator casing and fragments of the retaining ring 
could be expelled axially. Should the ring debris be 
expelled, it is assumed that it will travel in two 
possible direction; i) towards the turbine or ii) 
towards the exciter and out of the casing. Should the 
debris travel to the turbine there is potential for the 
fragments to impact the fuel gas line within the 
turbine. This then provides the escalation to a fire 
(given the location of the potential release, ignition is 
assumed). Should the debris travel out of the casing 
towards the exciter, it is considered by RMRI. Plc 
(2009) that while the axial velocity may be 
considerable, it is likely to be lower than the radial 
velocity that the debris would be expelled at were the 
casing and stator not there. Therefore, while it is 
possible for the ring debris to penetrate the casing, 
they would not have the required velocity to penetrate 
the module walls or deck. From this it is deemed that 
if retaining ring failure does not cause a bearing 
failure, then the consequence of the event is likely to 
be limited to the damages caused by the retaining ring 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008).  
However, should the main bearing fail, the 
potential consequences become much more severe. 
The significant damage caused by the bearing failure 
can potentially produce high velocity projectiles from 
the turbine blades being expelled and/or the exciter 
becoming detached (RMRI Plc., 2009). In these 
 Gas turbine 
Alternator 
 
(Retaining Rings are contained 
within, at each end of the Rotor)  
Main 
Bearings 
Exciter 
Main Shaft 
Figure 1. Generic diagram of an electrical generator unit 
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events, there is potential for the projectiles to impact 
the hydrocarbon containment around the module. 
4.3 Form Nodes and Arcs for the BN 
The initial model is demonstrated in Figure 2 and 
is designed around the variables identified section 
4.2, and is to represent the cause and effect of one 
initial component failure has on systems within the 
stated domain. The Initial BN model is not a direct 
representation of the sequence of events in terms of 
the section of the model where possible debris is 
expelled. Within the sequence of events if the debris 
is not expelled initially, it is assumed to remain in the 
alternator, yet if debris expelled, it is assumed to 
travel towards the exciter. Similarly, should the debris 
not be expelled to the exciter, it is assumed to be 
expelled towards the turbine. While this is all 
possible, it is more realistic to assume that if the 
debris is created from the retaining ring failure, it has 
the potential travel to the turbine and the exciter in the 
same instance. However, it is possible for debris to be 
expelled to the exciter and not to the gas turbine, 
whereby some debris would remain in the alternator. 
The way in which the BN model is created ensures it 
contains all relevant possible outcomes.  
In this case the analysis is conducted within an 
electrical generation module of a large offshore 
installation. The initial model is made up of seventeen 
chance nodes labelled 1 to 10 and E1 to E7. The latter 
nodes represent the possible events that can result 
from the initial mechanical failure. All nodes have 
two states (“Yes” and “No”) except for event node E6 
which has four (“Small”, “Medium”, “Full-bore” and 
“None”). The BN constructed from the variables 
outlined  is shown in Figure 2.  
4.4  Data acquisition and analysis 
It is important to note that the numerical results of 
the model are not significant in terms of being 
absolute, but rather to serve to demonstrate the 
practicability of the model. Once a full set of verified 
data is fed into the model, the confidence level 
associated with planning and decision making under 
uncertainty will improve.  
To complete the CPTs within a BN, certain data 
and knowledge is required regarding each specific 
node. For some nodes data is limited or not available. 
For cases where there is an absence of hard data, 
CPTs must be completed through subjective 
reasoning or the application of expert judgement. 
This process can be demonstrated by looking at the 
node “Event Escalation”. This node represents the 
chance of escalation following key component 
failures. The parents of this node are: “Turbine Blades 
Expelled”, “Exciter Detaches”, “Gas Import Riser 
Piping Impact” and “HP Flare Drum Shell Impact”. 
In order to put together an appropriate estimate, 
experts must judge the situation and provide their 
opinions. This data acquisition can be either 
qualitative or quantitative in nature. However, the 
child node “Event Escalation” has a CPT which is too 
large for an expert to simply fill with their own 
judgements and opinions. Therefore, an effective way 
to gather information, to fill these large CPTs, from 
Figure 2. BN Model shown with the Marginal Probabilities for each node. 
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experts is to apply the use of a Pairwise Comparison 
(PC) technique in questionnaires and make use of the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to analyse the 
results, combined with the symmetric method 
algorithm to fill the large CPTs (Zhang, et al., 2014).  
The AHP will produce a weighting for each parent 
criterion in the pairwise comparison matrix. These 
weighting are applied to a symmetric method which 
is utilised to fill large CPTs. The symmetric method 
provides an input algorithm which consists of a set of 
relative weights that quantify the relative strengths of 
the influences of the parent-nodes on the child-node, 
and a set of probability distributions the number of 
which grows only linearly, as opposed to 
exponentially, with the number of associated parent-
nodes (Lin & Kou, 2015) (Saaty, 1980).  
The PC, AHP and symmetric methods are not to 
be oulined here. However, the PC and AHP methods 
can be found in detail in Saaty, (1980) and Koczkodaj 
& Szybowski., (2015). The symmetric method can be 
found in Das, (2008).  Figure 2 shows the complete 
BN and the marginal probability distributions for 
each node.  
4.5 Results and Disscussions 
4.5.1  Analysis of BN model and Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Quantitaive analysis is carried out on a specific 
section of the Initial BN model, shown in Figure 3, 
concerning the event “E5. Event Escalation” and its 
parents.  
4.5.1.1 Quantitative Analysis 
This analysis involved systematically inserting 
evidence into each of the parent nodes and finally the 
child node. In addition, nodes 7 and 8 have a parent 
node “Generator Bearings” which has no evidence 
inserted, and there is no evidence inserted anywhere 
else within the model. However, in this section of the 
BN model nodes 7 and 8 are parents of nodes 9 and 
10 respectively, and therefore will alter the posterior 
probabilities of these nodes when evidence is 
inserted. This relationship has been left in the analysis 
to give an accurate representation of the posterior 
probabilities of the event E5, which is the focus node 
in this analysis. Several scenarios are considered for 
the BN analysis and validation.  
The first scenario is gas turbine blades being 
expelled as projectiles from the generator housing. 
This is completed by inserting 100% to state “Yes” in 
node 7. This increases the probability of the events 
escalating from 25.19% to 35.09%. This increase 
would involve some concern as a potential escalation 
from this is the impact of the turbine blades on the 
Gas Import Riser. Subsequently the probability of gas 
import riser impact increases from 6.2% to 25%. 
Furthermore, the second scenario involves the 
expulsion of the turbine blades along with a gas riser 
impact (100% “Yes” to nodes 7 and 9). This results 
in the probability of there being escalation increasing 
from 35.09% to 61.42%. This is a very large increase 
as the impact of a gas riser is the largest threat to 
escalation, due to the loss of containment of the gas, 
this hypothesis was also confirmed by expert opinion. 
It can also be noted that evidence is inserted into 
nodes 7 and 9, there is no effect on nodes 8 and 10, 
which is to be expected as they should be independent 
from each other. Should this scenario have the 
potential to occur, immediate action should be taken 
to prevent a major accident in the form of LOC of 
hydrocarbons and potential explosion & fire.  
The third scenario demonstrates the potential for 
escalation by showing that the generator’s exciter 
detaches, along with turbine blades expelled and gas 
riser impact (100% “Yes” to nodes 7, 8 and 9). It 
shows that again the potential for escalation increases 
from 61.42% to 63.86%. This scenario also increases 
the probability of the HP flare drum being impacted 
from 1.47% to 10%, dues to the influence of the 
Exciter Detaching (represented by node 8).  
Scenario five demonstrates the final influencing 
factor on the possibility of event escalation, whereby 
the HP flare drum is impacted (100% “Yes” to nodes 
7, 8, 9 and 10). This increases the potential for 
escalation from 63.86% to 77%.  
Figure 3. A) Specific section of BN to be analysed. B) Prior 
Probabilities for Event E5 and its parent nodes. 
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The final scenario, shown in Figure 4, 
demonstrates the effect of there being an escalated 
event, for example, observing an explosion or a fire 
within the area of the platform containing the 
electrical generator, and the effect this has on the 
influencing parameters. This serves to obtain areas 
that would require closer inspection. This scenario 
has given insight to the possible causes of the event 
escalation, based upon the data presented. Here the 
influencing factors are: “Turbine Blades Expelled” – 
Yes, increases from 0.12% to 0.17%; “Exciter 
Detaches” –Yes, increases from 0.15% to 0.17%; 
“Gas Import Riser Piping Impact” – Yes, Increases 
from 6.2% to 14.31%; and “HP Flare Drum Shell 
Impact” – Yes, increasing from 0.02% to 0.03%.  
4.5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The Sensitivity Analysis conducted for the Initial 
BN model focuses on the event E5 and its parent 
nodes, shown in Figure 3, to further validate the 
claims in Secton 4.5.1.1. However, the analysis will 
be conducted using smaller increases and decreases in 
the probabilities of the parent nodes as opposed to 
inserting 100% occurrence probability into the input 
node CPTs.  
From the graph in Figure 5 it can be seen that the 
most influential factor on “Event Escalation” is “Gas 
import Riser Impact”, whilst the least influential is 
“Exciter Detaches”. If the probability of State - ‘No’, 
“Gas Riser Impact” increases by 10%, then the 
probability of “Event Escalation” decreases by 
2.63%. Whereas, if the probability of State - ‘No’ 
Detaches” increases by, “Exciter 10%, then the 
probability of “Event Escalation” only decreases by 
0.29%. From the graph it is also apparent that the 
sensitivity function is a straight line which further add 
to the model validation. The sensitivity values 
computed within Hugin are shown in Table 1.  
It should be noted that the sensitivity values within 
Table 1 are negative as in their current states of ‘No’, 
they have a negative effect on the outcome of “Event 
Escalation” – ‘Yes’. For example; with the 
probability of “Turbine Blades Expelled” 
increasingly being ‘No’, it is less likely that “Event 
Escalation” – ‘Yes’ occurs.  
 
Table 1. Sensitivity Values for the four input nodes acting upon 
Event "E5. Event Escalation" 
4.5.2 Validation of the BN Model 
 
For partial validation of the model, it should 
satisfy the three axioms stated in Section 3.2.5. 
Examination of a specific part of the model (shown  
in Figure 3), reveals when node 7 is set to 100% 
‘Yes’, this produces a revised increase in probability 
for “Event Escalation” occurring from 25.19% to 
35.09%. A further change including both nodes 7 and 
9, set at 100% ‘Yes’, results in a further increase in 
the potential for “Event Escalation” occurring. 
Continually, nodes 7, 8, and 9 being set to 100% 
‘Yes’, again results in an increase for the potential for 
“Event Escalation” being of the state ‘Yes’. 
When nodes 7, 8, 9 and 10 are set to 100% ‘Yes’, 
it produces yet another increase in the probability of 
“Event Escalation occurring from 63.86% to 77.00%. 
Finally,    
This exercise of increasing each of the influencing 
nodes satisfies the three axioms states in Section 
3.2.5, thus giving partial validation to the BN Model.  
Input node: “state” Sensitivity value 
7. Turbine blades expelled: “No” -0.095 
8. Exciter detaches: “No -0.029 
9. Gas import riser impact: “No” -0.263 
10. HP flare drum shell impact: “No” -0.073 
Figure 4. BN Model Illustrating when "Event Escalation" takes 
place. 
Figure 5. Sensitivity Functions for the four input nodes acting upon 
Event "E5. Event Escalation" 
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5 CONCLUSIONS  
This research has outlined the Bayesian Network 
technique that has been used to model the cause and 
effect relationship of a specific component failure  of 
an electrical generation system, within a module of an 
offshore platform. It has been stated that offshore 
systems can be very complex and when coupled with 
the volume of data required to model failures within 
these systems, it makes BNs a challenge to model 
effectively. As well as in some cases a lack of reliable 
data means that some risk assessment models cannot 
always be applied. With this in mind, the  BN model 
demonstrates that BNs can provide an effective and 
applicable method of determining the likelihood of 
various events under uncertainty. The model can be 
used to investigate various scenarios around the 
systems and components outlined and to show the 
beginnings of establishing where attention should be 
focused within the objective of preventing offshore 
incidents, as well as having a clear representation of 
specifically where these accidents can originate from. 
The presented method of modelling offshore risk 
assessment is to be improved upon in future research. 
It has the potential to model larger areas with several 
systems and their components to gain a much wider 
understanding of how offshore systems interrelate. 
There are several interesting and relevant 
possibilities that can be considered and explored with 
relative ease now that the core structure of the BN 
model has been constructed. However, before 
expanding the model it is vital to maintain that it must 
remain practical and close to reality from the 
perspective of gathering data and generating results. 
Continually too many variables which display vague 
information or increasingly irrelevant effects can 
diminish the quality of results and findings.  
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